> If I can output the same quality at a faster rate of speed, why can't I have that time back to my own life now?

We have done a terrible job at allocating the net benefits of globalization. We will (continue to) do a terrible job at allocating the net benefits of productivity improvements.

The "why" is hard to answer. But one thing is clear: the United States has a dominant economic ideology, and the name of that ideology is not hardworker-ism.

Update: on appeal, the government is sticking to its original argument (see page 15 of the motion). So it appears that on appeal the government continues to believe the path of least resistance does not pass through the 1930 Act argument about which OP is asking.

In this case, age is not what disqualifies the law. Rather, what renders the law inapplicable to this situation is some combination of:

1. another statute that super-cedes the 1930 statute because it specifically limits Presidential emergency powers in the context of balance-of-trade issues. See around p. 35 of the slip opinion.

2. The Constitution itself, which limits Congress's ability to cede its own powers.

> why wouldn't the trump admin use the tariff act of 1930?

Probably because they knew it'd be a losing argument.

The court that authored this slip opinion would be unlikely to be persuaded by such an argument, for two reasons.

First, the opinion spends several pages applying the non-delegation and major questions doctrine. Based upon that discussion, I am pretty confident that this court would've found your interpretation of the Tariff Act of 1930 to be an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power. A similar question was asked in the Nixon admin; grep for "Yoshida II" in the PDF.

Second, even if your interpretation of the Tariff Act of 1930 were found to be constitutional by this court, the argument you suggest would still hit a brick wall.

Around page 35, the court cites the President's executive order in finding that the WaRTs are addressing a balance-of-payments issue. The court then notes that Congress specifically delegated narrower presidential authority for actions addressing balance-of-payments deficits. So even if the president were allowed broad emergency powers, and were allowed broad discretion in defining what emergency means, that finding would be irrelevant, because Congress has specifically curtailed the delegation of authority to the President in the case of tariffs addressing balance-of-trade issues.

Specifically, the opinion notes that Section 122 of Trade Act of 1974 limits Presidential authority to response to balance-of-payments problems, such as "a 15 percent cap on tariffs and a maximum duration of 150 days".

The conclusion also specifically addresses your question about emergency powers: "Congress’s enactment of Section 122 indicates that even “large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits” do not necessitate the use of emergency powers and justify only the President’s imposition of limited remedies subject to enumerated procedural constraints."

(These are not my opinions; I'm just applying the legal reasoning in the slip opinion to your question.)