
Why is the media obsessed with prediction markets?
For the past week, I’ve found myself playing the same 23-second CNN clip on repeat. I’ve watched it in bed, during my commute to work, at the office, midway through making carrot soup, and while brushing my teeth. In the video, Harry Enten, the network’s chief data analyst, stares into the camera and breathlessly tells his audience about the gambling odds that Donald Trump will buy any of Greenland. “The people who are putting their money where their mouth is—they are absolutely taking this seriously,” Enten says. He taps the giant touch screen behind him and pulls up a made-for-TV graphic: Based on how people were betting online at the time, there was a 36 percent chance that the president would annex Greenland. “Whoa, way up there!” Enten yells, slapping his hands together. “My goodness gracious!” The ticker at the bottom of the screen speeds through other odds: Will Gavin Newsom win the next presidential election? 19 percent chance. Will Viktor Orbán be out as the leader of Hungary before the end of the year? 48 percent chance.
These odds were pulled from Kalshi, which hilariously claims not to be a gambling platform: It’s a “prediction market.” People go to sites such as Kalshi and Polymarket—another big prediction market—in order to put money down on a given news event. Nobody would bet on something that they didn’t believe would happen, the thinking goes, and so the markets are meant to forecast the likelihood of a given outcome.
Prediction markets let you wager on basically anything. Will Elon Musk father another baby by June 30? Will Jesus return this year? Will Israel strike Gaza tomorrow? Will the longevity guru Bryan Johnson’s next functional sperm count be greater than “20.0 M/ejac”? These sites have recently boomed in popularity—particularly among terminally online young men who trade meme stocks and siphon from their 401(k)s to buy up bitcoin. But now prediction markets are creeping into the mainstream. CNN announced a deal with Kalshi last month to integrate the site’s data into its broadcasts, which has led to betting odds showing up in segments about Democrats possibly retaking the House, credit-card interest rates, and Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell. At least twice in the past two weeks, Enten has told viewers about the value of data from people who are “putting their money where their mouth is.”
On January 7, the media giant Dow Jones announced its own collaboration with Polymarket and said that it will begin integrating the site’s odds across its publications, including The Wall Street Journal. CNBC has a prediction-market deal, as does Yahoo Finance, Sports Illustrated, and Time. Last week, MoviePass announced that it will begin testing a betting platform. On Sunday, the Golden Globes featured Polymarket’s forecasts throughout the broadcast—because apparently Americans wanted to know whether online gamblers favored Amy Poehler or Dax Shepard to win Best Podcast.
Media is a ruthless, unstable business, and revenue streams are drying up; if you squint, you can see why CNN or Dow Jones might sign a contract that, after all, provides its audience with some kind of data. On air, Enten cites Kalshi odds alongside Gallup polls and Google searches—what’s the difference? “The data featured through our partnership with Kalshi is just one of many sources used to provide context around the stories or topics we are covering and has no impact on editorial judgment,” Brian Poliakoff, a CNN spokesperson, told me in a statement. Nolly Evans, the Journal’s digital general manager, told me that Polymarket provides the newspaper’s journalists with “another way to quantify collective expectations—especially around financial or geopolitical events.” In an email, Jack Suh, a Kalshi spokesperson, told me that the company’s partnerships are designed to inform the public, not to encourage more trading. Polymarket declined to comment.
The problem is that prediction markets are ushering in a world in which news becomes as much about gambling as about the event itself. This kind of thing has already happened to sports, where the language of “parlays” and “covering the spread” has infiltrated every inch of commentary. ESPN partners with DraftKings to bring its odds to SportsCenter and Monday Night Football; CBS Sports has a betting vertical; FanDuel runs its own streaming network. But the stakes of Greenland’s future are more consequential than the NFL playoffs.
The more that prediction markets are treated like news, especially heading into another election, the more every dip and swing in the odds may end up wildly misleading people about what might happen, or influencing what happens in the real world. Yet it’s unclear whether these sites are meaningful predictors of anything. After the Golden Globes, Polymarket CEO Shayne Coplan excitedly posted that his site had correctly predicted 26 of 28 winners, which seems impressive—but Hollywood awards shows are generally predictable. One recent study found that Polymarket’s forecasts in the weeks before the 2024 election were not much better than chance.
These markets are also manipulable. In 2012, one bettor on the now-defunct prediction market Intrade placed a series of huge wagers on Mitt Romney in the two weeks preceding the election, generating a betting line indicative of a tight race. The bettor did not seem motivated by financial gain, according to two researchers who examined the trades. “More plausibly, this trader could have been attempting to manipulate beliefs about the odds of victory in an attempt to boost fundraising, campaign morale, and turnout,” they wrote. The trader lost at least $4 million but might have shaped media attention of the race for less than the price of a prime-time ad, they concluded.
A billionaire congressional candidate can’t just send a check to Quinnipiac University and suddenly find himself as the polling front-runner, but he can place enormous Polymarket bets on himself that move the odds in his favor. Or consider this hypothetical laid out by the Stanford political scientist Andrew Hall: What if, a month before the 2028 presidential election, the race is dead even between J. D. Vance and Mark Cuban? Inexplicably, Vance’s odds of winning surge on Kalshi, possibly linked to shady overseas bets. CNN airs segment after segment about the spike, turning it into an all-consuming national news story. Democrats and Republicans point fingers at each other, and no one knows what’s really going on. Such a scenario is “plausible—maybe even likely—in the coming years,” Hall writes. It doesn’t help that the Trump Media and Technology Group, the owner of the president’s social-media platform, Truth Social, is set to launch its own platform, Truth Predict. (Donald Trump Jr. is an adviser to both Kalshi and Polymarket.)
The irony of prediction markets is that they are supposed to be a more trustworthy way of gleaning the future than internet clickbait and half-baked punditry, but they risk shredding whatever shared trust we still have left. The suspiciously well-timed bets that one Polymarket user placed right before the capture of Nicolás Maduro may have been just a stroke of phenomenal luck that netted a roughly $400,000 payout. Or maybe someone with inside information was looking for easy money. Last week, when White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt abruptly ended her briefing after 64 minutes and 30 seconds, many traders were outraged, because they had predicted (with 98 percent odds) that the briefing would run past 65 minutes. Some suspected, with no evidence, that Leavitt had deliberately stopped before the 65-minute mark to turn a profit. (When I asked the White House about this, the spokesperson Davis Ingle told me in a statement, “This is a 100% Fake News narrative.”)
Unintentionally or not, this is what happens when media outlets normalize treating every piece of news and entertainment as something to wager on. As Tarek Mansour, Kalshi’s CEO, has said, his long-term goal is to “financialize everything and create a tradable asset out of any difference in opinion.” (Kalshi means “everything” in Arabic.) What could go wrong? As one viral post on X recently put it, “Got a buddy who is praying for world war 3 so he can win $390 on Polymarket.” It’s a joke. I think.
Not just America, everything is. With stock market, at least we can somehow stop the bad actors, insider traders, corporate manipulation, pumps and dumps - with prediction markets, there is no way.
With prediction markets? Next to impossible. The markets being tied to crypto makes it even worse - things get harder to track, jurisdictions get blurry, proving becomes a ping pong between bureaucracy. And proving something becomes moreso a question of free will - if I decided to do X and then someone bets millon dollars on me doing X when odds are low, how do you prove I haven't decided to do X before? Will you prevent me from exercising my free will because of suspect insider trading? What if I am a president/senator?
Years ago, I was a kid who discovered online betting - often it was the only time I could place bets on MMA events, especially because it wasn't as popular as it is now. Even then, the gambling sites had "Other" options where you could bet on presidents, popes, landing on mars etc. The new markets aren't that much different, but are just using a nicer way to talk about it.
It isn't gambling, it's prediction.
You aren't a gambler, you're a "hyperinformed high iq individual predicting the geopolitical moves". Just like crypto gave people the identity crutch of a "tech investor", this gives them the identity crutch of a "geopolitical strategist".
But in the end, it is still just gambling - wrapped in a nice ego stroking suit, but gambling none the less.
There are some distinctions between gambling and prediction markets. For example, in prediction markets, some forms of insider trading are considered somewhat desirable - essentially, it monetizes insiders leaking inside information.
Other forms of insider trading can be problematic: What if someone (could be an individual or even an uncoordinated group) bets millions of dollars on you not doing X, in the hopes of you taking the opposite bet and doing X?
The most extreme that I've seen presented so far are markets where people can predict the death date of a person. On the surface, that just seems like a morbid bet. Once you consider the above form of insider trading, you realize that this can act as a reward for someone who can accurately predict the death date of said person, for example because they're making the counter-trade from a phone next to a high-powered rifle on the rooftop across the street - and like in the bribe example above, the people on the "losing" side of the bet might not mind too much. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_market
I've never quite understood what's supposed to be so mind-blowing about the assassination market concept. I think the concept is supposed to be that assigning legal responsibility for such a killing would be difficult, since no one is literally paying an assassin.
But surely the answer is just that governments can and should ban prediction markets that are deemed to directly incentivize a crime. Where exactly to draw the line is challenging, sure, but no more challenging than all the other stuff that legal systems have to deal with. After all, pretty much any existing market (like stock markets) could be influenced by murdering certain people.
You may say "oh, but assassination markets are unique in that they're hard to ban those markets because they use cryptocurrencies and other decentralized/anonymous/censorship-resistant communication technologies." Well, okay, but if those technologies are so effective than people can already just run normal murder-for-pay markets.
I am completely against any narrative attempt to distinguish gambling and prediction markets.
> What if someone (could be an individual or even an uncoordinated group) bets millions of dollars on you not doing X, in the hopes of you taking the opposite bet and doing X?
From their POV, that's the purest form of voting with money. If you do X, they're presumably happy with the outcome they just paid for; if you do the opposite of X, they at least have their payouts as consolation prize.
>What if someone (could be an individual or even an uncoordinated group) bets millions of dollars on you not doing X, in the hopes of you taking the opposite bet and doing X?
If the market is efficient and aware of the bribery effect, others will bet that you will do X up to the point where the indirect bribe is equal to the cost of you doing X. If you have private knowledge that a bribe would be taken, you probably have the access to do it far cheaper off market (and you can still use crypto).
As a matter of adopting sensible definitions, I think you need to draw the line somewhere between what is gambling and what is not.
If the risk taken can, in principle, be shifted in your favour (i.e. to produce positive expectation) through application of skill, then it isn't gambling. For example, in my mind, betting on whether you will win a game of chess is not gambling. On the other hand, if you cannot influence the outcome in your favour through skill, then it is gambling. Roulette is generally a good example of this (with the caveat that in some very specific circumstances it's possible to beat with skill).
If we're limiting the definition to merely risk-taking (you might win or you might lose) without factoring in skill, then virtually everything in life becomes gambling. For example, you gamble when you deposit money in the bank because it might go bust.
There's also the legal definition, in which case it's just a matter of checking whether the jurisdiction you are in considers the activity to be gambling or not.
I would say that gambling with skill component is still gambling. For example, in blackjack you can limit your losses by following a basic strategy, which is a 2x2 matrix with rows containing the value of your hand and columns containing the open dealer card.
If you can obtain an edge through a skill component (card counting in blackjack), some people wouldn't call this gambling anymore, but I would still call it gambling myself. Someone doing this for a living is a professional gambler.
What for me would be a sensible definition is that a bet/gamble has no other goals. Putting money in the bank/investing in a stock reallocates capital, which can be invested by someone. The fact that it is a risk-taking endeavor is merely a side effect. I would say the same goes for selling/buying insurance for your car.
So for me, the difference between betting and putting money in the bank/investing is that the primary goal is something different than the risk-taking activity.
Many sports gamblers (horse racing, etc.) will say it’s about skill. They believe they shift the risk in their favor because they have the data and because they bet strategically so as to win over long term. (They can spend a while detailing it for you if you are willing to listen.)
Prediction markets in general can make anyone feel like it’s about data and skills. If they lose, then they didn’t have the good enough information, so clearly they should improve their skill, right?
From my understanding, purely natural events aside, the probability of you betting against the “house” will always approach 1. If the platform is centralised, they have a strong incentive to influence the stakes, or (this has been documented) straight up limit your ability to bet if you are winning “too much”—enough to cost them real money. If the platform is open and decentralised, “house” is another player with much more capital and personal influence in the matter than you (for example, some president can bet that he would invade a country—and then invade it; some footballer can bet that he wouldn’t score N times—then score N-1 and fake an injury at the most favourable time; of course, they would use intermediaries, and only the careless ones will get burnt).
The “skill” line is what gamblers tell themselves to justify it. A much more useful demarcation is “does this game have any positive impact on the world” (entertainment value of the gambling itself doesn’t count). For example, insurance is not gambling even though it is itself a zero sum game, it enables societally beneficial risk taking. Options trading on real assets like stock aid in price discovery. Memecoins, sports betting, your local poker game and the way prediction markets actually function in practice are all gambling.
> “…betting on whether you will win a game of chess is not gambling.”
It’s the money aspect that makes it gambling. Just ask Pete Rose.
Talking about "traditional" sports gambling rather than prediction markets: how do we account for the heavy restrictions they place on "sharps" (consistent winners)? If a game can be won through application of skill, but winning through application of skill causes you to be effectively banned, then the game cannot be won through application of skill.
I thought the commonly-held definition of gambling is: "it's gambling if it introduces risk."
e.g. a transaction to buy paper towels is not introducing risk, since I pay an amount and get something.
If I have a chance of not receiving those paper towels if I put money in, then it's considered gambling because the inherent activity introduces risk. It's the same reason the lootboxes were considered gambling at first, and the same reason I classify betting on a chess game as gambling. You're player may potentially not win.
Is it gambling if the outcome can be shifted through the application of your money and influence?
>For example, in my mind, betting on whether you will win a game of chess is not gambling
As a general rule it is considered gambling not if skill is involved, but if there is any uncertainty involved.
And because there is not such thing as a perfect application of skill, all applications of skill have a degree of uncertainty to them. And you don't necessarily know how much your skill and luck will be in effect in the game.
In the context of Chess. Do you get to choose who you play against or is there a random draw? How close is the other player to you in skill? If you are both alike in skill then the skill application will be less important to the outcome.
I once lost a game at a tournament that had the rule that usage of en passant required saying en passant before doing it, so I was playing this guy whose skill was abysmal, we walked into a scenario where the very next move he did was going to allow me to do en passant, he had to take that move, or do something else that would lead to me taking his queen in the next move, and then folding up pretty all of his pieces and coming out two queens ahead. If he did the en passant move his position was worse, it was checkmate in like 10 moves.
If he had seen it and had any politeness and grace he would have just resigned. I mean it was extremely painful to have gotten into this position because it could be seen 20 moves before we were going to end up here and yet, he laboriously walked in to it, he could have gotten out before, by sacrificing a horse, and then a bit later he could have gotten out by sacrificing a horse and a knight, and then a horse and a knight and a castle, etc. etc. But nope, he just made move by stupid move into this position.
So then he made the move that I should make en passant with and ... I forgot the term "en passant" I couldn't remember the term to use, my brain froze, I probably let the clock run for ten minutes trying to remember the word, it's also not like I didn't know the move and the phrase, I had known it that 20 moves ago when I was thinking I do A, he do B I do C... and then en passant. But I couldn't remember.
Now if I had been not such a stickler for rules I might just have done it anyway hoping for him to accept and not require me to say it, but I didn't. So he won. Later my friend played him and he said "You lost to that guy?!" and I said "fuck I froze up and forgot the word to en passant, I had him setup to take all his stuff but because I forgot the word he had me. Damn it"
Despite differences of skill other factors can prevent the skill from being deployed to its greatest effect. If someone knew Bryan is skillful, but he does have a habit of choking up or sometimes losing focus in longer games, whereas that guy there sucks so the odds are 4 to 1 in Bryan's favor (which I was very much more skillful than this guy, so embarrassing), but that guy is skillful enough to drag it out a bit, and he will never give in, therefore it might make sense for me to bet a small amount in this case to leverage the uncertainty.
Because of course that kind of gambling is itself a form of skill.
If you only consider gambling on things that do not have any skill component, you then essentially say that gambling does not take any skill, which then leaves you with a large sphere of skilled activity, that many people have taken part in for many years of human society and that has traditionally been known as gambling, which now does not have a name to identify it.
What should this field of activity that you have rendered nameless by your fiat be called then?
Stock market integrity is important because of their function in the economy. Scamming of gambling addicts is tragic but not detrimental to society.
That is one of the takes I've ever read. There is a reason gambling is so tightly regulated worldwide, and it's certainly not because governments hate easy vice tax revenue. Gambling debt destroys family units, increases poverty rates (most notably for the children of gambling addicts -- the consequences are not localised only to the person making the bad decisions), and increases violent crime rates. Gambling is massively detrimental to society. There can be arguments in allowing people to do things that are detrimental to society in the name of freedom, but it's not a great thing to pretend those detriments don't exist at all.
> Scamming of gambling addicts is tragic but not detrimental to society.
This isn't true.
each 10 per cent increase in gambling expenditure in NSW results in more than
4,500 additional assaults
2,800 additional home break-ins
1,300 additional break and enter (non-dwelling) offences
1,400 additional motor vehicle thefts
2,300 additional stealing from motor vehicle thefts
3,800 additional fraud offences each year
https://www.connections.edu.au/news/strong-link-between-gamb...> Stock market integrity is important because of their function in the economy
Some might argue that people - including gambling addicts, and those impacted by their addiction - might possibly be more important than one of many possible financial mechanisms for free enterprise.
You are ignoring the point of TFA. Kalshi & Polymarkets provide a marketplace to monetise political decision-making, a.k.a corruption. This is definitely detrimental to society.
First of all, anyone getting scammed is detrimental to society because society is made out of people and those are people getting scammed. Gambling addicts are not less important than wealthy people.
Second, these markets are generating new gambling addicts, which is wildly and provably detrimental to society.
Just so we're clear on the standards of solidarity here, someone murdering your entire family would be tragic but not detrimental to society. How much should society do to prevent that from happening?
>Scamming of gambling addicts is tragic but not detrimental to society.
It certainly is at scale.
> Scamming of gambling addicts is tragic but not detrimental to society.
I used to believe that. With the legalization of all the sports betting and how fast it can drain a gambler which can then affect the gambler's family, I'm now pretty much on the other side of the fence.
Just like we banned public smoking because of the effects of secondhand smoke, I'm pretty convinced that the secondary effects of gambling means it needs to go back to being banned. I don't see an obvious way to legislate gambling to prevent the auxiliary victims. It doesn't help that getting maximum profit as a bookie means being part of a group of the scummiest people on the planet who will stoop to anything to drain people of their money as fast as possible.
Depends on how many of those gambling addicts there are.
If a huge enough portion of the population try to solve the statue quo of their economic problems by betting all on red, that's not gonna be great for society, including those who don't gamble.
The gambling industry itself is a net drain on society.
What is the societal benefit provided by it?
Have you watched sports recently? Gambling has always had a negative effect on the perceived fairness but once that effect becomes a core part of the way the sport is monetized it gets even worse for everyone involved. Watching playoff games last weekend either Draft Kings or Fan Duel showed an ad where a single person in a crowded bar is cheering wildly by themselves while looking at their parlay bet or whatever on their phone - this isolation of the communal experience alone is a definitely a negative effect but I could go on...
Gambling is frying the brains of a disturbing proportion of genZ and millennial men. It's destroying sports and infecting politics. It's quite detrimental to society.
Except when "gambling adicts" end up as a cover for money laundering and funneling cash to people to buy influence.
Until people are making money and affecting the world. Let's say that you're someone close to Trump and you have betted a very large sum that Trump should take a certain action. Are you going to try to make him take that action even if at that point it turns out to be the worst decision for the country and the world?
>You aren't a gambler, you're a "hyperinformed high iq individual predicting the geopolitical moves"
And finally, here it is: The one guy who won the Venezuela bet by being hyperinformed-high-iq-predicting-the-future: https://futurism.com/future-society/polymarket-venezuela-ins...
(btw: you forgot to add AI and blockchain!)
To be fair, if you were aware enough to separate the characteristics of wealth and intelligence, you've probably seen the investing world as a casino with ego-stroking suits long before this. The difference between the cigarette-burning retiree surrendering their OASDI check at a casino in Kansas City and Wall Street investors is a diploma from the "right" schools and in the ability to sway the odds in their favor; they both can - and will - destroy themselves or those around them to indulge in their habit.
Any sort of announced intention to "somehow stop the bad actors" became laughable after 2008-2009. We had bankers and financiers kick the monetary legs out from under an entire generation and unless they did something blatantly illegal (read: were Bernie Madoff) none of them faced a consequence.
That's why you have the current situation in the US where scammers can take advantage of distrust in any and all of society's institutions, up to and including the federal government.
You wrote this post with AI.
Someone's ai classifier bot posted again
If only there was some sort of way to see if a given market participant's behavior was best explained as a "high iq individual predicting geopolitical moves" vs. "just gambling".
Maybe a number of some kind?
> The irony of prediction markets is that they are supposed to be a more trustworthy way of gleaning the future than internet clickbait and half-baked punditry, but they risk shredding whatever shared trust we still have left. The suspiciously well-timed bets that one Polymarket user placed right before the capture of Nicolás Maduro may have been just a stroke of phenomenal luck that netted a roughly $400,000 payout. Or maybe someone with inside information was looking for easy money.
I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here, because the example seems to support the point that these are meant to be a way of learning the future, not oppose it. I thought the whole point was that yes, people with inside knowledge will bet large sums of money on things they expect to happen, and that's what makes the prediction useful. The market is meant to incentivize people who know things to act on them in a way that makes them known.
If I knew someone wanted me dead, of course I would want a prediction market on it, and if the odds suddenly shifted dramatically in favor of my death, I would use that as a trigger for whatever defense strategies I had in place. Someone has really good reason to bet a lot of money on the prospect that I'm about to die. It's probably someone who knows of an active plot in motion to try to kill me! The sooner I can find out about that, the better. I would much rather give them an incentive to make that known somewhat earlier than wait.
I feel like there must be some big piece of this puzzle that I'm missing that makes it so these cannot operate the way I imagine them, but I haven't heard anyone explaining what it is. Someone fill me in on what I'm missing here?
If the prediction market is for a non-trivial amount, it's likely someone is going to kill you in exchange for the money the prediction market offered them. The prediction market isn't acting as a prophet here, it's acting as a plausibly deniable murder for hire service and you are its victim.
The people "betting against" you dying just paid to have you killed.
Exactly, these markets exist in the real world, so as their size and use increases, the more likely the odds will influence real world events. Look at sports betting for a much smaller example. Match fixing is known. Electricity markets are gamed for individual profits at the detriment to everyone and the stability of the system, even with regulators trying to keep things stable. Enough "Market for all the things" already..
This was discussed on polymarket with the Galve Goat burning bet and assume it's why
Essentially it's a big straw goat in Sweden that vandals sometime set on fire.
Right towards the end as the probability approaches zero there's a huge profit incentive, "done deals" usually go under well under 1¢ meaning 100-200x returns.
A US man once traveled to Sweden to set the goat on fire, he was caught, fined $20k(?) and then fled the country before paying the fine.
Risk reward in a situation like this absolutely creates a situation for prediction markets similar to the observer effect in physics, it's no longer predicting the future and instead altering it.
Yes, OOP might have chosen a suboptimal example here. But for general newsworthy events, people aren’t going to be in positions to manually make them happen. And no person in a position to start a war would do it to affect a Polymarket bet.
It's not a bounty, though, right? It operates like other trading markets? So unless they have big money to wager, they don't have big money to gain. If it's hovering at, say, 10% odds, it's not like they can automatically 10x their money because other people have to take the opposite side. There would have to be a lot of liquidity in the market for their large bet not to move the odds, and as the odds move, they make less money.
Why would the opposing side of that exact same bet allow themselves to be fleeced of all that money for free?
> I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here
You're correct in your understanding of prediction markets with respect to traders using insider information. There are a couple things going on here. One is the subtext from most news media now that Technology Bad. New technologies are treated as guilty until proven innocent, because that is a more engaging narrative for readers. So in this case, those covering this stuff immediately latch onto the rich get richer, insider trading viewpoint, and that gets reported without any analysis of why that might actually be desirable.
Second, prediction markets, in trying to become broadly accessible to "normal" people and desiring liquidity, need a marketing strategy that is understandable. They can't put out a Robin Hanson article as marketing material. So they market by appealing to something people do already understand, which is gambling. The public has this idea now of prediction markets as a way to make money, not as a tool for learning information. So the default perspective on insider trading is now one of unfairness: somebody used their privileged position to make money. The correct perspective is, in fact, that prediction markets are providing users with value by eliciting information from those insiders, information that the public would not otherwise have. The latter perspective is mostly foreign to degenerate gamblers, and the marketing campaigns of Kalshi and Polymarket aren't helping.
I don't think it's so easy to get true information out of all the noise in the markets, and in any case, I don't see how this helps with the fact that corruption is bad. So what if I learn that a country will be wrongfully invaded? Can I have someone impeached for it?
The missing piece is the distinction between a market that observes reality and a market that instigates it.
The criticism is about the systemic risk of converting prediction markets into "Assassination Markets"—mechanisms where the payout is not a reward for foresight, but a bounty for action.
In the case of Maduro, the operation cost around $300 million so a $400,000 payout isn’t providing a financial incentive.
But in the case of assassination, a $400,000 payout is sufficient motivation.
> In the case of Maduro, the operation cost around $300 million so a $400,000 payout isn’t providing a financial incentive.
It is if you are spending someone else’s $300 million, and getting the $400,000 yourself.
But it's not a bounty. It's a market, right? So the payout is split among everyone on your side? And the if you try to dump a ton (measured relative to the size of the market) into the market, the price tanks because there aren't enough people coming in on the other side. You get a big wick in the trading candle, so you scoop up the much less favorable terms of the bet at higher cost.
> I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here, because the example seems to support the point that these are meant to be a way of learning the future, not oppose it. I thought the whole point was that yes, people with inside knowledge will bet large sums of money on things they expect to happen, and that's what makes the prediction useful. The market is meant to incentivize people who know things to act on them in a way that makes them known.
Except the paragraph you quoted nullify this benefit
> The suspiciously well-timed bets that one Polymarket user placed right before the capture of Nicolás Maduro
So we learnt nothing. For the entire duration the stock is online, its pretty much 50/50 then suddenly 1 day before, the ticker spikes to yes.
Yes, but it spikes BEFORE the attack begins, which means we learnt someone thought there was a string reason to believe things were about to change earlier than we otherwise would have.
That's the whole point, isn't it?
And if you're going to tell me the paragraph I quoted nullifies what I've said, would you please explain how? Obviously I don't currently understand it the same way you do, and I have asked for help understanding what I'm missing. Saying, "You're missing it," isn't helpful.
> I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here, because the example seems to support the point that these are meant to be a way of learning the future, not oppose it.
Indeed. Insider trading is a feature of prediction markets, not a bug. There are two kinds of people who participate in prediction markets:
1. People who have insider information, or at least more sophisticated predictive capability than your average person.
2. Gamblers.
In effect, prediction markets are a way to move wealth from the second group to the first. If you understand that and still want to participate, cool. It's your money, and you're allowed to gamble it away if you find that entertaining.
At any rate, given the relatively small-potatoes level of bets going on at Polymarket and Kalshi, the article author's breathless anxiety about this is a bit overblown.
> 1. People who have insider information, or at least more sophisticated predictive capability than your average person.
This bucket as you've defined it is too broad.
There are a few different kinds of non-gambler participants in prediction markets:
1. People with "insider information" as we think of it - they "know" the answer to the market because they are "involved" somehow.
2. People who aim to do superior analysis of publicly available information to produce an edge. For example, an AI firm with better hurricane prediction modeling may try to monetize that by betting on whether or not a hurricane will impact an area.
2b. People who do the work to create new information. For example, the Trump 2024 election market on polymarket famously had better odds for Trump than polling. It turned out that a mega whale was bidding Trump up because he had paid for his own private polling in battleground states and that gave him confidence Trump was going to win.
In short, it's mostly incorrect to suggest that prediction market participants are either illegitimate insiders or gamblers; there is a third class of actors that are a very important cohort: those who do the work to create better predictions and monetize their work by betting in the markets. This third cohort of professional predictors is the most important in long-term prediction market growth.
Kalshi and Polymarket have a billion dollar of open interest between them (though velocity here matters too and volume is not very useful). The important thing is they are growing fast. Which means it might become big-potatoes very soon.
>1. People who have insider information,
I mean, most stock trading prevents insider trading, unless of course you're a in congress.
Seemingly regulators consider this a bug in every other market type, but suddenly this gambling market allows it?
> breathless anxiety about this
All fun and games until people start dying from it.
> I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here, because the example seems to support the point that these are meant to be a way of learning the future, not oppose it. I thought the whole point was that yes, people with inside knowledge will bet large sums of money on things they expect to happen, and that's what makes the prediction useful. The market is meant to incentivize people who know things to act on them in a way that makes them known.
You're ignoring the critical issue of timing. It's one thing to crowd-source knowledge in a steady, homogenous way. It's quite another for an actor with material knowledge of the situation to exploit this dramatic information asymmetry to turn a profit, revealing the new information at the last possible timepoint it could be used to lay a wager. Insider trading is quite different from a Hayek-style price signalling, and it's the same here. In principle (and on long time-scales) these markets can incentivize important information to come to light sure, but in infinite time we're all dead anyways. The short-time dynamics matter a lot more, from a social welfare perspective.
>If I knew someone wanted me dead, of course I would want a prediction market on it [...] Someone fill me in on what I'm missing here?
The assassin might place the bet at roughly the same time as they place the bullet in the chamber. Making the prediction into a bounty. Not giving you any meaningful time to ponder the new information. The notification from your phone would be the distraction they'd use when taking aim.
> I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here
> If I knew someone wanted me dead, of course I would want a prediction market on it, and if the odds suddenly shifted dramatically in favor of my death
No, you definitely would not want that. You don't want to live in the world like this. That's the point.
It's fucking horrible and dystopian, people betting on extra-legal invasions of countries, murders, things that could hurt or harm people where they have incentives to do something else that you've just distorted.
Gambling has been illegal, immoral, and proscribed by religions for literally thousands of years, in all sorts of different forms and iterations, for a reason. Because it's incredibly toxic to society.
You can make some arguments that pure games of chance, like casino games, and even maybe sports betting (since sports is a spectacle) aren't that bad. Based on what we've seen recently, I tend to disagree, but at least it's an argument.
But now we're talking about betting on all sorts of political issues, things that are illegal, things where people are acting in an official capacity and shouldn't be given incentives to subvert that. And all these other examples are just bad. There's not really any upside to this at all. It's just bad for society and it shouldn't happen. It's horrible.
If you feel like you're missing a big piece of the puzzle you should take a couple of steps back and think about the consequences of a world where this is common.
I think easy gambling over the internet is terrible, tons of young people are getting stuck in it. People get addicted to it throughout history and ruin their lives, vulnerable people get in trouble with huge losses.
But I don't think we should do anything because religion doesn't like it - that's a foolish thing to use to make your crucial choices or world view. A key reason is pretty much every terrible thing ever was excused as requirement of some religion or forever. Separate from the hurtful things in religious books at times, it's too easy for leaders or authorities to somehow justify actions.
Let's instead use a goal of treating each other respectfully, stop hating and killing each other. Yeah, that's all naive stuff, we aren't there, maybe we'll never be there. Still a good goal, treat each other with kindness. And yeah, I'm an optimistic sort.
I think the problem is that I don't think it would end up primarily being about gambling.
I already live in a world where people make odds about whether I'm going to die. They're called "actuaries," and they work at life insurance companies. There are also oddsmakers of the same kind at car insurance companies, etc.
Right now, I hate that people who can actually analyze enough data to make odds about these things can only earn a living working for companies that are incentivized to find ways not to pay out when the odds do break against them. I'd much rather these people be able to make their livings just calculating odds, placing bets, and being right. I would like to have access to their calculations, and not be in a position of "just take it or leave it" when I'm evaluating a prospective plan from a life insurance company, for example.
Yes, by all means, there will be gamblers in these markets. There will always be some amount of noise, just like there is in the stock market. But why would that end up being the bulk of the industry? Just like with Wall Street, I would expect companies to grow up around these markets that specialize in getting the odds of things right, and making money off of their predictions. If the market ever became truly efficient, I think we would have a MUCH better idea than we do now about the likelihood of all kinds of things.
Heck, even if I think of something as apparently mundane as weather forecasting, if somebody came up with a breakout model that was right substantially more often, I would expect they would be able to raise all sorts of capital around it and start winning in all the weather forecasting markets, which would then make their predictions a reliable signal, and we'd finally have better information about what the weather is going to do.
I think one part I must be missing is why so many people are assuming that the primary user of prediction markets would be gamblers instead of specialists, especially once they operated at scale. I just don't see why that would happen. Anywhere there's an opportunity to make money reliably by coming up with better analysis or prediction tools, capital will flock there and incentivize coming up with better analysis or prediction tools.
I think I really would like to live in a world where that was highly incentivized, and I'm confused why people would not want that.
ETA: I don't think the gamblers would ruin this any more than they ruin Wall Street. I don't think they have enough capital to matter. (They are, after all, prone to losing money.)
It appears you are missing any cursory philosophy, ethics, logic, etc. courses.
Me too, and I wish you would have answered the clear request for enlightenment instead of pointing out the obvious fact that we weren't in your class.
Ironically, I actually have a philosophy degree. If I'm still missing the point, I really don't think it's because I haven't learned how to think.
All I can really do in this case is ask for explanation. If you're enough higher and mightier than I am that you don't care to give me one, that's fine. You don't have to. It's just kind of...unnecessarily condescending to rub my face in it without even trying?
One of the problems is that by creating a prediction market for your death, you may be creating a hit for yourself.
You enable different enemies to crowdsource for your bounty, and as soon as it is deemed worthy by a hitman, they might take up on the job by placing the opposite bet.
It's a very specific example but the mechanics work for most events in a similar fashion.
It is for this reason that event creation is not open to the public, but rather handled by the regulated markets themselves
The interesting thing to me about this example is that it had to be someone lower level in or near the administration with less wealth, but who knew about a military operation. Hard to imagine any of the rich people around him risking a bet for such a small sum.