Iran-backed hackers claim wiper attack on medtech firm Stryker

2026-03-123:29268287krebsonsecurity.com

A hacktivist group with links to Iran's intelligence agencies is claiming responsibility for a data-wiping attack against Stryker, a global medical technology company based in Michigan. News reports…

A hacktivist group with links to Iran’s intelligence agencies is claiming responsibility for a data-wiping attack against Stryker, a global medical technology company based in Michigan. News reports out of Ireland, Stryker’s largest hub outside of the United States, said the company sent home more than 5,000 workers there today. Meanwhile, a voicemail message at Stryker’s main U.S. headquarters says the company is currently experiencing a building emergency.

Based in Kalamazoo, Michigan, Stryker [NYSE:SYK] is a medical and surgical equipment maker that reported $25 billion in global sales last year. In a lengthy statement posted to Telegram, an Iranian hacktivist group known as Handala (a.k.a. Handala Hack Team) claimed that Stryker’s offices in 79 countries have been forced to shut down after the group erased data from more than 200,000 systems, servers and mobile devices.

“All the acquired data is now in the hands of the free people of the world, ready to be used for the true advancement of humanity and the exposure of injustice and corruption,” a portion of the Handala statement reads.

The group said the wiper attack was in retaliation for a Feb. 28 missile strike that hit an Iranian school and killed at least 175 people, most of them children. The New York Times reports today that an ongoing military investigation has determined the United States is responsible for the deadly Tomahawk missile strike.

Handala was one of several Iran-linked hacker groups recently profiled by Palo Alto Networks, which links it to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Palo Alto says Handala surfaced in late 2023 and is assessed as one of several online personas maintained by Void Manticore, a MOIS-affiliated actor.

Stryker’s website says the company has 56,000 employees in 61 countries. A phone call placed Wednesday morning to the media line at Stryker’s Michigan headquarters sent this author to a voicemail message that stated, “We are currently experiencing a building emergency. Please try your call again later.”

A report Wednesday morning from the Irish Examiner said Stryker staff are now communicating via WhatsApp for any updates on when they can return to work. The story quoted an unnamed employee saying anything connected to the network is down, and that “anyone with Microsoft Outlook on their personal phones had their devices wiped.”

“Multiple sources have said that systems in the Cork headquarters have been ‘shut down’ and that Stryker devices held by employees have been wiped out,” the Examiner reported. “The login pages coming up on these devices have been defaced with the Handala logo.”

Wiper attacks usually involve malicious software designed to overwrite any existing data on infected devices. But a trusted source with knowledge of the attack who spoke on condition of anonymity told KrebsOnSecurity the perpetrators in this case appear to have used a Microsoft service called Microsoft Intune to issue a ‘remote wipe’ command against all connected devices.

Intune is a cloud-based solution built for IT teams to enforce security and data compliance policies, and it provides a single, web-based administrative console to monitor and control devices regardless of location. The Intune connection is supported by this Reddit discussion on the Stryker outage, where several users who claimed to be Stryker employees said they were told to uninstall Intune urgently.

Palo Alto says Handala’s hack-and-leak activity is primarily focused on Israel, with occasional targeting outside that scope when it serves a specific agenda. The security firm said Handala also has taken credit for recent attacks against fuel systems in Jordan and an Israeli energy exploration company.

“Recent observed activities are opportunistic and ‘quick and dirty,’ with a noticeable focus on supply-chain footholds (e.g., IT/service providers) to reach downstream victims, followed by ‘proof’ posts to amplify credibility and intimidate targets,” Palo Alto researchers wrote.

The Handala manifesto posted to Telegram referred to Stryker as a “Zionist-rooted corporation,” which may be a reference to the company’s 2019 acquisition of the Israeli company OrthoSpace.

Stryker is a major supplier of medical devices, and the ongoing attack is already affecting healthcare providers. One healthcare professional at a major university medical system in the United States told KrebsOnSecurity they are currently unable to order surgical supplies that they normally source through Stryker.

“This is a real-world supply chain attack,” the expert said, who asked to remain anonymous because they were not authorized to speak to the press. “Pretty much every hospital in the U.S. that performs surgeries uses their supplies.”

John Riggi, national advisor for the American Hospital Association (AHA), said the AHA is not aware of any supply-chain disruptions as of yet.

“We are aware of reports of the cyber attack against Stryker and are actively exchanging information with the hospital field and the federal government to understand the nature of the threat and assess any impact to hospital operations,” Riggi said in an email. “As of this time, we are not aware of any direct impacts or disruptions to U.S. hospitals as a result of this attack. That may change as hospitals evaluate services, technology and supply chain related to Stryker and if the duration of the attack extends.”

This is a developing story. Updates will be noted with a timestamp.

Update, 2:54 p.m. ET: Added comment from Riggi and perspectives on this attack’s potential to turn into a supply-chain problem for the healthcare system.


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Comments

  • By strict9 2026-03-1214:054 reply

    It appears personal devices were also impacted by this via Microsoft Intune. That app is presented to employees as a way to get their email/slack on their personal device without giving IT systems access to it.

    IT systems around the country say that they have no access to your personal data and there they can only block access to Intune apps.

    But the linked reddit thread[1] in this article notes personal devices getting wiped and locked out.

    [1]: https://www.reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/comments/1rqopq0/stry...

    • By mjlee 2026-03-1214:542 reply

      Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) MDM profiles typically don't allow personal data access outside of their sandbox, but they almost always include remote wipe capabilities.

      iOS at least displays a very clear warning when you import the profile telling you exactly what it can do.

      Not that this isn't awful, but it's good to be clear on what this can do when used within normal expectations.

      • By quantified 2026-03-137:00

        Which is why I allow Slack but not Teams or Exchange-based mail on my phone. Give me a company phone if you want me to use Teams.

    • By stackskipton 2026-03-1214:42

      Knowing InTune MDM setup, it has two modes, control a few apps or control entire phone. iOS will tell you during setup what's happening and I've been at plenty of companies where employees are told "It's just for our apps" but it's really full Device Control. $TwoCompaniesAgo tried that "It's just for our applications" but when I went to install it, iOS went "This is 100% full device control" and I rejected it.

    • By mcoliver 2026-03-130:54

      Intune has two modes. Device registration and User registration. And two kinds of wipes, retire and wipe. Retire means only delete your work profile and is only available for User registration mdm. Sounds like Stryker didn't configure intune properly for byod to force users with personal devices to use User registration.

      Beyond that there are so many other things in intune you can use to prevent this sort of thing. Short lived / JIT credentials with MFA, ip restrictions, multi admin approval, rbac (role based fine tuned permissions eg help desk can't wipe, only retire ) etc. sounds like there were some big misses here.

      Also sounds like they were in the system long enough to exfiltrate 50+ TB of data without setting off alarm bells.

    • By DANmode 2026-03-1214:092 reply

      MDM enrollment has colloquially meant your device could be wiped for the security|incompetency of your firm for quite some time.

  • By marijan_div 2026-03-124:572 reply

    Stryker is far more than ambulance gurneys. They’re one of the largest med-tech suppliers, with equipment in operating rooms, ICUs, and surgical departments everywhere.

    If a wiper actually hit internal systems, the bigger concern isn’t consumer data but disruption to manufacturing, logistics, and hospital support. That kind of outage could ripple through a lot of hospitals pretty quickly.

    • By thisislife2 2026-03-1315:54

      Does it serve the US military?

    • By Dowry9092 2026-03-1211:511 reply

      Go and switch your suppliers my friends, talk to purchasing now.

      • By levinb 2026-03-1220:541 reply

        Stryker holds monopoly supplier positions for a number of medical products, esp including surgical implants and associated OR tools.

        If Stryker stays down, supplies of some things will run out soon and many people will find themselves without medical procedures available.

        • By klipt 2026-03-1317:09

          Yet another reason monopolies are bad.

  • By JonChesterfield 2026-03-124:594 reply

    So gain access to a machine that can ask microsoft intune to eviscerate the company, ask it to do so, done. Bit of a shame all the machines had that installed really. Reminds me of crowdstrike.

    • By shiroiuma 2026-03-126:312 reply

      The company should have known better than to trust their IT infrastructure to Microslop. This is their own fault.

      • By Xylakant 2026-03-126:411 reply

        My 95% bet is that the attacker just gained access to an account with suitable privileges and then went on to use existing automation. The fact that it’s intune is largely irrelevant - I’m not aware of any safeguards that any provider would implemen.

        So the options here are MDM or no MDM and that’s a hard choice. No MDM means that you have to trust all people to get things as basic as FDE or a sane password policy right. No option to wipe or lock lost devices. No option to unlock devices where people forgot their password. Using an MDM means having a privileged attack vector into all machines.

        • By neo_doom 2026-03-129:351 reply

          No MDM just isn’t an option for most enterprises but ideally the keys to the kingdom are properly secured.

          • By mulmen 2026-03-1210:391 reply

            How does that look exactly? Someone has to be able to use MDM to manage devices or there’s no point in having it. This scenario is firmly in rubber hose/crescent wrench cryptanalysis territory. Can updates have delays with approval gates built in? Does MDM need a break glass capability?

            • By heraldgeezer 2026-03-1214:472 reply

              "Principle of least privilege" as MS calls it.

              Do not use global admin or admin account as daily driver for one. Dont save it in browser etc either.

              Limit roles, even within the application, here Intune.

              Office 365 also has conditional access and many policy leavers to tweak, many cases of people locking themselves OUT of 365. So the gates work but you need to configure them.

              "Break glass" global admin accounts now also require MFA. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authenticat...

              • By pixl97 2026-03-1221:11

                At the end of the day someone needs remote wipers privs, and in a large company it's something done pretty often.

              • By mulmen 2026-03-1216:571 reply

                Ok and who has access to the global admin and how resistant are they to Iranian operatives?

                • By heraldgeezer 2026-03-1217:481 reply

                  What are you asking?

                  For Stryker specifically? We don't and probably won't know details.

                  For companies in general? Background checks, security clearance etc are done if the company determines this necessary and are willing to pay for the process and higher salary.

                  • By mulmen 2026-03-132:081 reply

                    I’m asking if it’s possible to secure the MDM process in a way that Iranian operatives can’t simply torture an administrator into pushing the big red MDM button.

      • By heraldgeezer 2026-03-128:342 reply

        [flagged]

        • By JonChesterfield 2026-03-129:292 reply

          Well, all the machines in the current outfit are Linux as far as I know. Services are self hosted. Seems to be fine, teams et al run adequately in a browser for talking to people on other stacks.

          Previous place had a corporate controlled windows laptop that made a very poor thin client for accessing dev machines. One before that had a somewhat centrally managed macbook that made a very poor thin client for accessing dev machines.

          You don't have to soul bond to Microsoft to get things done.

          • By Ekaros 2026-03-129:451 reply

            I don't see how Linux would prevent anything if company wants similar controls on their machines. Like tracking update status, forcing updates when needed, potentially wiping entire device when stolen and so on. Fault really is not the OS but the control corporate wants over their devices. And it does make some sense.

            • By pjc50 2026-03-1211:121 reply

              Indeed. You'd expect a corporate IT system to be able to ssh as root into all their devices. And the cloud is even worse: if you get hold of the right IAM role, you can simply delete everything! That does usually get locked behind proper 2FA, but it's not impossible to phish even experienced admins once in a while.

              • By namibj 2026-03-1314:18

                Compare to the Facebook global BGP breakage and the amount of hands-on authorization that needed to happen to recover.

                And no, there are plenty systems you don't want to have root ssh on.

                Mainframes require 4-eyes administration to do more nuanced "root" things than picking up a sledgehammer and physically smashing drives.

          • By heraldgeezer 2026-03-1211:33

            That is all well and good but how do you:

            - Ensure the Linux machines are up-to-date and users are not just indefinitely postponing OS updates?

            - Same as above but with programs/software

            - How do you ensure correct settings configuration in terms of security? Say default browser, extensions, program access etc?

            - Re-image or reinstall the OS when there are issues or PC handover to another employee? Manually with a USB stick?

            This kind of control exists and is needed for Linux and MacOS too. RMM is not a Windows only thing...

            The critics here see Intune but what if they used another RMM and they compromised another cloud RMM account? Same issue.

        • By pjc50 2026-03-1211:152 reply

          All the Linux kernel development work is organized around a mailing list, and some private IRC chats for the core people. It's the technology of the nineties but it works for them.

          A lot of corporate stuff seems to be much worse than even a random vibe coded web app. I have to book holiday through something called "HR Connect", watching pages load laboriously and redirect every login through several very long URLs. Slowly.

          • By bathtub365 2026-03-1214:08

            The Linux kernel development work isn’t a corporation

          • By heraldgeezer 2026-03-1211:37

            Yes, the Linux kernel people can be trusted to manage their own machines. Random corp employees cannot. Also corp machines are corp property, not the employees own. If you have 1000 or 10,000 machines you need to manage them. Full stop.

            Yes, many corporate websites are bad. Like ERP or HR systems. None of that has to do with device management, RMMs/MDMs or Intune.

    • By GorbachevyChase 2026-03-1218:40

      Microsoft keeps disappointing and chief technology officers keep paying them. Wasn’t Elon Musk supposed to prove you could vibe code their entire product line? What happened to all that?

    • By nclin_ 2026-03-1220:00

      [dead]

    • By heraldgeezer 2026-03-128:332 reply

      [flagged]

      • By JonChesterfield 2026-03-129:424 reply

        An alternative is people install the software they choose to on the machines they're using. Optionally write a list of suggested programs down somewhere.

        In that world, there is no central IT team pushing changes to machines and arguing with developers about whether they really need to be able to run a debugger.

        I don't know how to keep windows machines alive. It's probably harder.

        • By nubinetwork 2026-03-1222:22

          Not feasible when you have a fleet of 5000 devices and 15000 users, most of whom both roam locally and remotely.

        • By pjc50 2026-03-1210:50

          It's annoying, but it's also grossly irresponsible to let dev machines get compromised. Regardless of which OS they are running.

        • By heraldgeezer 2026-03-1211:331 reply

          That is all well and good but how do you:

          - Ensure the machines are up-to-date and users are not just indefinitely postponing OS updates?

          - Same as above but with programs/software

          - How do you ensure correct settings configuration in terms of security? Say default browser, extensions, program access etc?

          - Re-image or reinstall the OS when there are issues or PC handover to another employee? Manually with a USB stick?

          This kind of control exists and is needed for Linux and MacOS too. RMM is not a Windows only thing...

          The critics here see Intune but what if they used another RMM and they compromised another cloud RMM account? Same issue.

          Also, here there is no "arguing". They order the software from our portal and it gets pushed into Company Portal via Intune...

          Write down a list you say... idk what to say. You have only worked for small startups I gather? Nothing wrong with that but please recognize that these types of limits and programs are not deployed for fun or to ruin your day.

          • By rcxdude 2026-03-130:511 reply

            I hear zero-trust is a trendy buzzword at the moment, so let's apply the basic idea here: having a hard shell and a soft and chewy center is not a security posture that works, in practice. You need to harden at every level. RMM uber-admin credentials are the ultimate soft center: you compromise those, you can kill the entire IT infrastructure. The only alternative is to distribute access: have multiple smaller IT teams that adminster small parts of the system, with more 'central' roles providing services but not having full control of most machines. It's not a fun option, but it might also work a lot better if each team can actually adjust policies for the environment they're working in as opposed to trying to have one completely unified policy for an entire multi-thousand employee company. And, for critical systems, I would seriously consider the wisdom of having a remote 'wipe and reformat' button at all.

            At a bare minimum, your backup systems should have a completely disjoint set of credentials to your main systems, stored and controlled differently, ideally by a seperate team, if you have the resources.

            (And the arguing becomes a problem when IT ceases to consider their job to be solving problems for users within some constraints, and just starts to consider their job to be enforcing those constraints. This also mixes badly with incompetence, which tends to turn everything into a tedious tick-box exercise that neither improves security nor solves user's problems. It's not a good time to have an IT department that can't resist any new security checkbox a vendor offers but can't figure out how to work any of their fancy tools to make life even the slightest bit smoother for their users)

            • By heraldgeezer 2026-03-1313:101 reply

              Can you like I did name a company or technology that works like this?

              Companies use M365 or Gsuite. Go.

              I can type words too but they dont mean anything.

              "Make it good zero trust wowo"

              • By rcxdude 2026-03-1316:36

                Everyone doing it doesn't make it a good idea. The big tech companies and governments are I think a little more paranoid about rouge admins, so they do at least try to limit the blast radius of any given credential, but almost no-one else has that level of maturity, which creates this pretty big chasm in the resiliance of IT organisations as you go from small to large.

                (There's also a certain irony about IT complaining that a change to improve security would mean they can't do their job as easily)

        • By vntok 2026-03-1210:26

          I, for one, don't really want employees to install video games, porn cam clients, torrenting apps, shady vpn clients, crypto miners, remote access tools, dns "optimizers" and more generally viruses on their work computers.

      • By pjc50 2026-03-1211:031 reply

        On HN, if you have a valid point but get unnecessarily aggressive about it, people will downvote you for attitude. This mostly keeps the forum under control.

        • By heraldgeezer 2026-03-1211:391 reply

          I am sorry and I get carried away sometimes but it is frustrating seeing comments from cowboy devs saying to just give everyone admin, have an excel sheet of software and have people manage their own PC and to get rid of IT just because as here they got phished or breached.

          That works for a 5 person company but not a 1000 person company. Or a 10 person company with 1000 machines.

          • By hananova 2026-03-1213:041 reply

            I used to work in test automation for a huge company with terribly annoying IT. I can tell you for a fact that our entire department had well-developed workarounds for the most annoying policies. We even had a few intune 0-days that we literally kept to ourselves to be able to do our jobs properly.

            Because in the end, it’s not IT on the line for their odious policies causing late delivery, it was us.

            • By heraldgeezer 2026-03-1214:471 reply

              What was so annoying? Having to reboot for Windows updates/programs and MS Defender running?

              Also, if the company is certified in some way there are audits for these things, you understand? Such as updates, backups, security, PAM, antivirus etc :)

              Subvert these controls intentionally, especially security ones = bye bye. Logs don't lie. We see you.

              • By hananova 2026-03-131:00

                We never got caught or fired. I won’t detail the 0-days we used because I’m pretty sure the team is still using them, but I can assure you that the logs DID lie.

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