DDoS Botnet Aisuru Blankets US ISPs in Record DDoS

2025-10-1323:21181142krebsonsecurity.com

The world's largest and most disruptive botnet is now drawing a majority of its firepower from compromised Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices hosted on U.S. Internet providers like AT&T, Comcast and…

The world’s largest and most disruptive botnet is now drawing a majority of its firepower from compromised Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices hosted on U.S. Internet providers like AT&T, Comcast and Verizon, new evidence suggests. Experts say the heavy concentration of infected devices at U.S. providers is complicating efforts to limit collateral damage from the botnet’s attacks, which shattered previous records this week with a brief traffic flood that clocked in at nearly 30 trillion bits of data per second.

Since its debut more than a year ago, the Aisuru botnet has steadily outcompeted virtually all other IoT-based botnets in the wild, with recent attacks siphoning Internet bandwidth from an estimated 300,000 compromised hosts worldwide.

The hacked systems that get subsumed into the botnet are mostly consumer-grade routers, security cameras, digital video recorders and other devices operating with insecure and outdated firmware, and/or factory-default settings. Aisuru’s owners are continuously scanning the Internet for these vulnerable devices and enslaving them for use in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that can overwhelm targeted servers with crippling amounts of junk traffic.

As Aisuru’s size has mushroomed, so has its punch. In May 2025, KrebsOnSecurity was hit with a near-record 6.35 terabits per second (Tbps) attack from Aisuru, which was then the largest assault that Google’s DDoS protection service Project Shield had ever mitigated. Days later, Aisuru shattered that record with a data blast in excess of 11 Tbps.

By late September, Aisuru was publicly flexing DDoS capabilities topping 22 Tbps. Then on October 6, its operators heaved a whopping 29.6 terabits of junk data packets each second at a targeted host. Hardly anyone noticed because it appears to have been a brief test or demonstration of Aisuru’s capabilities: The traffic flood lasted less only a few seconds and was pointed at an Internet server that was specifically designed to measure large-scale DDoS attacks.

A measurement of an Oct. 6 DDoS believed to have been launched through multiple botnets operated by the owners of the Aisuru botnet. Image: DDoS Analyzer Community on Telegram.

Aisuru’s overlords aren’t just showing off. Their botnet is being blamed for a series of increasingly massive and disruptive attacks. Although recent assaults from Aisuru have targeted mostly ISPs that serve online gaming communities like Minecraft, those digital sieges often result in widespread collateral Internet disruption.

For the past several weeks, ISPs hosting some of the Internet’s top gaming destinations have been hit with a relentless volley of gargantuan attacks that experts say are well beyond the DDoS mitigation capabilities of most organizations connected to the Internet today.

Steven Ferguson is principal security engineer at Global Secure Layer (GSL), an ISP in Brisbane, Australia. GSL hosts TCPShield, which offers free or low-cost DDoS protection to more than 50,000 Minecraft servers worldwide. Ferguson told KrebsOnSecurity that on October 8, TCPShield was walloped with a blitz from Aisuru that flooded its network with more than 15 terabits of junk data per second.

Ferguson said that after the attack subsided, TCPShield was told by its upstream provider OVH that they were no longer welcome as a customer.

“This was causing serious congestion on their Miami external ports for several weeks, shown publicly via their weather map,” he said, explaining that TCPShield is now solely protected by GSL.

Traces from the recent spate of crippling Aisuru attacks on gaming servers can be still seen at the website blockgametracker.gg, which indexes the uptime and downtime of the top Minecraft hosts. In the following example from a series of data deluges on the evening of September 28, we can see an Aisuru botnet campaign briefly knocked TCPShield offline.

Paging through the same uptime graphs for other network operators listed shows almost all of them suffered brief but repeated outages around the same time. Here is the same uptime tracking for Minecraft servers on the network provider Cosmic (AS30456), and it shows multiple large dips that correspond to game server outages caused by Aisuru.

Multiple DDoS attacks from Aisuru can be seen against the Minecraft host Cosmic on Sept. 28. The sharp downward spikes correspond to brief but enormous attacks from Aisuru. Image: grafana.blockgametracker.gg.

BOTNETS R US

Ferguson said he’s been tracking Aisuru for about three months, and recently he noticed the botnet’s composition shifted heavily toward infected systems at ISPs in the United States. Ferguson shared logs from an attack on October 8 that indexed traffic by the total volume sent through each network provider, and the logs showed that 11 of the top 20 traffic sources were U.S. based ISPs.

AT&T customers were by far the biggest U.S. contributors to that attack, followed by botted systems on Charter Communications, Comcast, T-Mobile and Verizon, Ferguson found. He said the volume of data packets per second coming from infected IoT hosts on these ISPs is often so high that it has started to affect the quality of service that ISPs are able to provide to adjacent (non-botted) customers.

“The impact extends beyond victim networks,” Ferguson said. “For instance we have seen 500 gigabits of traffic via Comcast’s network alone. This amount of egress leaving their network, especially being so US-East concentrated, will result in congestion towards other services or content trying to be reached while an attack is ongoing.”

Roland Dobbins is principal engineer at Netscout. Dobbins said Ferguson is spot on, noting that while most ISPs have effective mitigations in place to handle large incoming DDoS attacks, many are far less prepared to manage the inevitable service degradation caused by large numbers of their customers suddenly using some or all available bandwidth to attack others.

“The outbound and cross-bound DDoS attacks can be just as disruptive as the inbound stuff,” Dobbin said. “We’re now in a situation where ISPs are routinely seeing terabit-per-second plus outbound attacks from their networks that can cause operational problems.”

“The crying need for effective and universal outbound DDoS attack suppression is something that is really being highlighted by these recent attacks,” Dobbins continued. “A lot of network operators are learning that lesson now, and there’s going to be a period ahead where there’s some scrambling and potential disruption going on.”

KrebsOnSecurity sought comment from the ISPs named in Ferguson’s report. Charter Communications pointed to a recent blog post on protecting its network, stating that Charter actively monitors for both inbound and outbound attacks, and that it takes proactive action wherever possible.

“In addition to our own extensive network security, we also aim to reduce the risk of customer connected devices contributing to attacks through our Advanced WiFi solution that includes Security Shield, and we make Security Suite available to our Internet customers,” Charter wrote in an emailed response to questions. “With the ever-growing number of devices connecting to networks, we encourage customers to purchase trusted devices with secure development and manufacturing practices, use anti-virus and security tools on their connected devices, and regularly download security patches.”

A spokesperson for Comcast responded, “Currently our network is not experiencing impacts and we are able to handle the traffic.”

9 YEARS OF MIRAI

Aisuru is built on the bones of malicious code that was leaked in 2016 by the original creators of the Mirai IoT botnet. Like Aisuru, Mirai quickly outcompeted all other DDoS botnets in its heyday, and obliterated previous DDoS attack records with a 620 gigabit-per-second siege that sidelined this website for nearly four days in 2016.

The Mirai botmasters likewise used their crime machine to attack mostly Minecraft servers, but with the goal of forcing Minecraft server owners to purchase a DDoS protection service that they controlled. In addition, they rented out slices of the Mirai botnet to paying customers, some of whom used it to mask the sources of other types of cybercrime, such as click fraud.

A depiction of the outages caused by the Mirai botnet attacks against the internet infrastructure firm Dyn on October 21, 2016. Source: Downdetector.com.

Dobbins said Aisuru’s owners also appear to be renting out their botnet as a distributed proxy network that cybercriminal customers anywhere in the world can use to anonymize their malicious traffic and make it appear to be coming from regular residential users in the U.S.

“The people who operate this botnet are also selling (it as) residential proxies,” he said. “And that’s being used to reflect application layer attacks through the proxies on the bots as well.”

The Aisuru botnet harkens back to its predecessor Mirai in another intriguing way. One of its owners is using the Telegram handle “9gigsofram,” which corresponds to the nickname used by the co-owner of a Minecraft server protection service called Proxypipe that was heavily targeted in 2016 by the original Mirai botmasters.

Robert Coelho co-ran Proxypipe back then along with his business partner Erik “9gigsofram” Buckingham, and has spent the past nine years fine-tuning various DDoS mitigation companies that cater to Minecraft server operators and other gaming enthusiasts. Coelho said he has no idea why one of Aisuru’s botmasters chose Buckingham’s nickname, but added that it might say something about how long this person has been involved in the DDoS-for-hire industry.

“The Aisuru attacks on the gaming networks these past seven day have been absolutely huge, and you can see tons of providers going down multiple times a day,” Coelho said.

Coelho said the 15 Tbps attack this week against TCPShield was likely only a portion of the total attack volume hurled by Aisuru at the time, because much of it would have been shoved through networks that simply couldn’t process that volume of traffic all at once. Such outsized attacks, he said, are becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to mitigate.

“It’s definitely at the point now where you need to be spending at least a million dollars a month just to have the network capacity to be able to deal with these attacks,” he said.

RAPID SPREAD

Aisuru has long been rumored to use multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in IoT devices to aid its rapid growth over the past year. XLab, the Chinese security company that was the first to profile Aisuru’s rise in 2024, warned last month that one of the Aisuru botmasters had compromised the firmware distribution website for Totolink, a maker of low-cost routers and other networking gear.

“Multiple sources indicate the group allegedly compromised a router firmware update server in April and distributed malicious scripts to expand the botnet,” XLab wrote on September 15. “The node count is currently reported to be around 300,000.”

A malicious script implanted into a Totolink update server in April 2025. Image: XLab.

Aisuru’s operators received an unexpected boost to their crime machine in August when the U.S. Department Justice charged the alleged proprietor of Rapper Bot, a DDoS-for-hire botnet that competed directly with Aisuru for control over the global pool of vulnerable IoT systems.

Once Rapper Bot was dismantled, Aisuru’s curators moved quickly to commandeer vulnerable IoT devices that were suddenly set adrift by the government’s takedown, Dobbins said.

“Folks were arrested and Rapper Bot control servers were seized and that’s great, but unfortunately the botnet’s attack assets were then pieced out by the remaining botnets,” he said. “The problem is, even if those infected IoT devices are rebooted and cleaned up, they will still get re-compromised by something else generally within minutes of being plugged back in.”

A screenshot shared by XLabs showing the Aisuru botmasters recently celebrating a record-breaking 7.7 Tbps DDoS. The user at the top has adopted the name “Ethan J. Foltz” in a mocking tribute to the alleged Rapper Bot operator who was arrested and charged in August 2025.

BOTMASTERS AT LARGE

XLab’s September blog post cited multiple unnamed sources saying Aisuru is operated by three cybercriminals: “Snow,” who’s responsible for botnet development; “Tom,” tasked with finding new vulnerabilities; and “Forky,” responsible for botnet sales.

KrebsOnSecurity interviewed Forky in our May 2025 story about the record 6.3 Tbps attack from Aisuru. That story identified Forky as a 21-year-old man from Sao Paulo, Brazil who has been extremely active in the DDoS-for-hire scene since at least 2022. The FBI has seized Forky’s DDoS-for-hire domains several times over the years.

Like the original Mirai botmasters, Forky also operates a DDoS mitigation service called Botshield. Forky declined to discuss the makeup of his ISP’s clientele, or to clarify whether Botshield was more of a hosting provider or a DDoS mitigation firm. However, Forky has posted on Telegram about Botshield successfully mitigating large DDoS attacks launched against other DDoS-for-hire services.

In our previous interview, Forky acknowledged being involved in the development and marketing of Aisuru, but denied participating in attacks launched by the botnet.

Reached for comment earlier this month, Forky continued to maintain his innocence, claiming that he also is still trying to figure out who the current Aisuru botnet operators are in real life (Forky said the same thing in our May interview).

But after a week of promising juicy details, Forky came up empty-handed once again. Suspecting that Forky was merely being coy, I asked him how someone so connected to the DDoS-for-hire world could still be mystified on this point, and suggested that his inability or unwillingness to blame anyone else for Aisuru would not exactly help his case.

At this, Forky verbally bristled at being pressed for more details, and abruptly terminated our interview.

“I’m not here to be threatened with ignorance because you are stressed,” Forky replied. “They’re blaming me for those new attacks. Pretty much the whole world (is) due to your blog.”


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Comments

  • By martinald 2025-10-140:257 reply

    This really is a function of two things:

    1) (Mainly) the huge increase in upstream capacity of residential broadband connections with FTTH. It's not uncommon for homes to have 2gbit/sec up now and certainly 1gbit/sec is fairly commonplace, which is an enormous amount of bandwidth compared to many interconnects. 10, 40 and 100gbit/sec are the most common and a handful of users can totally saturate these.

    2) Many more powerful IoT devices that can handle this level of attack outbound. A $1 SoC can easily handle this these days.

    3) Less importantly, CGNAT is a growing problem. If you have 10k (say) users on CGNAT that are compromised, it's likely that there's at least 1 on each CGNAT IP. This means you can't just null route compromised IPs as you are effectively null routing the entire ISP.

    I think we probably need more government regulation of these IoT devices. For example, having a "hardware" limit of (say) 10mbit/sec or less for all networking unless otherwise required. 99% all of them don't need more than this.

    • By bsder 2025-10-141:266 reply

      > If you have 10k (say) users on CGNAT that are compromised, it's likely that there's at least 1 on each CGNAT IP. This means you can't just null route compromised IPs as you are effectively null routing the entire ISP.

      How about we actually finally roll out IPv6 and bury CGNAT in the graveyard where it belongs?

      Suddenly, everybody (ISPs, carriers, end users) can blackhole a compromised IP and/or IP range without affecting non-compromised endpoints.

      And DDoS goes poof. And, as a bonus, we get the end to end nature of the internet back again.

      • By lgeek 2025-10-142:065 reply

        From having worked on DDoS mitigation, there's pretty much no difference between CGNAT and IPv6. Block or rate limit an IPv4 address and you might block some legitimate traffic if it's a NAT address. Block a single IPv6 address... And you might discover that the user controls an entire /64 or whatever prefix. So if you're in a situation where you can't filter out attack trafic by stateless signature (which is pretty bad already), you'll probably err on the side of blocking larger prefixes anyway, which potentially affect other users, the same as with CGNAT.

        Insofar as it makes a difference for DDoS mitigation, the scarcity of IPv4 is more of a feature than a bug.

        • By zamadatix 2025-10-142:59

          (Having also worked on DDoS mitigation services) That "entire /64" is already hell of a lot more granular than a single CG-NAT range serving everyone on an ISP though. Most often in these types of attacks it's a single subnet of a single home connection. You'll need to block more total prefixes, sure, but only because you actually know you're only blocking actively attacking source subnets, not entire ISPs. You'll probably still want something signature based for the detection of what to blackhole though, but it does scale farther in a combo on the same amount of DDoS mitigation hardware.

        • By spongebobstoes 2025-10-142:19

          you can heuristically block ipv6 prefixes on a big enough attack by blocking a prefix once a probabilistic % of nodes under it are themselves blocked, I think it should work fairly well, as long as attacking traffic has a signature.

          consider simple counters "ips with non-malicious traffic" and "ips with malicious traffic" to probabilistically identify the cost/benefit of blocking a prefix.

          you do need to be able to support huge block lists, but there isn't the same issue as cgnat where many non-malicious users are definitely getting blocked.

        • By swinglock 2025-10-146:521 reply

          You should block the whole /64, at least. It's often a single host. It's often but not always a single host, that's standardized.

          • By vladvasiliu 2025-10-147:092 reply

            Usually a /64 is a "local network", so in the case of consumer ISPs that's all the devices belonging to a given client, not a single device.

            Some ISPs provide multiple /64s, but in the default configuration the router only announces the first /64 to the local network.

            • By TZubiri 2025-10-147:221 reply

              Presumably a compromised device can request arbitrarily new ipv6 from the dhcp so the entire block would be compromised. It would be interesting to see if standard dhcp could limit auto leasing to guard reputation of the network

              • By vladvasiliu 2025-10-1415:09

                Generally, IPv6 does autoconfiguration (never seen a home router with DHCPv6), so no need to ask for anything. Even for ipv4, I've never seen a home router enforce DHCP (even though it would force the public ip).

                But the point stands, you can't selectively punish a single device, you have to cut off the whole block, which may include well-behaved devices.

            • By swinglock 2025-10-1421:25

              In mobile networks it's usually a single device.

        • By bsder 2025-10-146:251 reply

          This DDoS is claimed to be the result of <300,000 compromised routers.

          That would be really easy to block if we were on IPv6. And it would be pretty easy to propagate upstream. And you could probabilistically unblock in an automated way and see if a node was still compromised. etc.

          • By josteink 2025-10-1412:281 reply

            > That would be really easy to block -- if we were on IPv6.

            Make that: If the service being attacked was on IPv6-only, and the attacker had no way to fall back to IPv4.

            As long as we are dual-stack and IPv6 is optional, no attacker is going to be stupid enough to select the stack which has the highest probability of being defeated. Don't be naive.

            • By div72 2025-10-1413:55

              It'd be far more acceptable to block the CG-NAT IPv4 addresses if you knew that the other non-compromised hosts could utilize their own IPv6 addresses to connect to your service.

        • By TZubiri 2025-10-147:21

          Better to rely on ip blocks than on NAT to bundle blocks.

      • By ralnivar 2025-10-142:142 reply

        I am a bit split this topic. There is some privacy concerns with using ipv6. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7721.html#page-6

        Some time ago I decided for our site to not roll out ipv6 due to these concerns. (a couple of million visitors per month) We have meta ads reps constantly encourage us to enable it which also do not sit right with me.

        Although I belive fingerprinting is sofisticated enough to work without using ip's so the impact of using ipv6 might not be a meaningful difference.

        • By miyuru 2025-10-146:061 reply

          its hilarious that you have privacy concerns while at the same time using meta ads.

          • By Xss3 2025-10-1418:16

            I am guessing they're trying to limit the privacy harm to normal channels that the slightly savvy can understand rather than completely eliminate it.

        • By GoblinSlayer 2025-10-147:17

          Reportedly this is often incorrectly implemented, where /64 prefix is still a stable static address.

      • By nine_k 2025-10-142:283 reply

        Is there any money an ISP would make, or save, by sinking money and effort on switching to IPv6? If there's none, why would they act? If there is some, where?

        For instance, mobile phone operators, which had to turn ISPs a decade or two ago, had a natural incentive to switch to IPv6, especially as they grew. Would old ISPs make enough from selling some of their IPv4 pools?

        • By rendaw 2025-10-143:07

          Presumably they'd lose money when a DDoS originating from their network causes all their ips to get blocked.

        • By beeflet 2025-10-142:39

          less expensive IP space, more efficient hardware, and lower complexity if you can eliminate NAT.

        • By ROBLOX_MOMENTS 2025-10-142:401 reply

          They already lease them out. TELUS in Canada traditional old ISP rents large portion of their space to a mostly used for Chinese GFW VPN server provider in LA „Psychz“

          • By TZubiri 2025-10-147:251 reply

            The ISPs have to submit plans on how to use their IPs for the public,especially for IPv4, Arnic shouldn't approve this kind of stuff. Unless they lied in their ip block application, in which case they should be revoked their block.

            • By Braxton1980 2025-10-1419:071 reply

              I filled out one of these for Cogent to get a /24. I was being honest but all I had to put was services that requires their own IP. I even listed a few but no where near the 253.

              They also never responded back and were like "what about NAT" or "what about host based routing".

              • By TZubiri 2025-10-152:551 reply

                Not sure what you filled out, but blocks are handed usually not to end users, but to providers that will sublease the ips to their client. So if you are asking for a block for a couple of your HTTP servers, that's a no. If you rent HTTP servers to, say, local small businesses, then that's a yes.

      • By josteink 2025-10-1412:26

        > How about we actually finally roll out IPv6 and bury CGNAT in the graveyard where it belongs?

        That depends on the service you are DDosing actually having an IPv6 presence. And lots of sites really don't.

        It doesn't help if you have IPv6 if you need to fallback to IPv4 anyway. And if bot-net authors knows they can hide behind CGNAT, why would they IPv6 enable their bot-load when all sites and services are guaranteed to be reachable bia IPv4 for the next 3 decades?

        (Disclaimer: This comment posted on IPv6)

      • By rectang 2025-10-142:05

        Is it advantageous to be someone who supports IPv6 on a day like today?

      • By createaccount99 2025-10-1410:05

        Isn't it enough that the target of the DDOS only accepts ipv6?

    • By toast0 2025-10-141:212 reply

      > 3) Less importantly, CGNAT is a growing problem. If you have 10k (say) users on CGNAT that are compromised, it's likely that there's at least 1 on each CGNAT IP. This means you can't just null route compromised IPs as you are effectively null routing the entire ISP.

      Null routing is usually applied to the targets of the attack, not the sources. If one of your IPs is getting attacked, you null route it, so upstream routers drop traffic instead of sending it to you.

      • By martinald 2025-10-141:45

        Sorry, late here. You are right. I mean filter the IP in question.

    • By idiotsecant 2025-10-142:411 reply

      Haha that last part is pretty wild. rather than worrying about systemic problems in the entire internet let's just make mandates crippling devices that China, where all these devices are made, will defffinitely 100% listen to. Sure, seems reasonable. Systems that rely on the goodwill of the entire world to function are generally pretty robust, after all.

      • By saagarjha 2025-10-142:522 reply

        If they don’t then the devices are not sold in the United States. It’s quite simple.

        • By dylan604 2025-10-144:391 reply

          Great to know that smuggling hardware into the US has been completely stopped.

          • By morsch 2025-10-146:07

            If the analysis above is accurate, a few smuggled devices would not be an issue, as long as the zillions of devices sold at Walmart are compliant.

        • By idiotsecant 2025-10-1513:481 reply

          Congratulations on the creation of a thriving new black market in which the main beneficiary is organized crime! What could go wrong?

          • By saagarjha 2025-10-168:021 reply

            Do you take issue with the concept of laws or are you just being annoying?

            • By idiotsecant 2025-10-1616:461 reply

              I'm sorry that you find thinking about second order dynamics annoying, but that's what you have to do if you actually want effective laws. Just making laws doesn't magically fix problems. In many cases it just makes much more exciting problems.

              • By saagarjha 2025-10-199:23

                I'm annoyed because you didn't actually come up with an interesting response. Yes, when you make laws people can break them. But you need to explain why there is an incentive to break them, and whether it will happen to the extent that it will actually be a problem to enforce. Personally, I don't see people scrambling to get DDoS attack vectors in their house by any means necessary.

    • By gjsman-1000 2025-10-141:312 reply

      > I think we probably need more government regulation of these IoT devices. For example, having a "hardware" limit of (say) 10mbit/sec or less for all networking unless otherwise required. 99% all of them don't need more than this.

      What about DDoSs that come from sideloaded, unofficial, buggy, or poorly written apps? That's what IoT manufacturers will point to, and where most attacks historically come from. They'll point to whether your Mac really needs more than 100mbps.

      The government is far more likely to figure it out along EU lines: Signed firmware, occasional reboots, no default passwords, mandatory security updates for a long-term period, all other applicable "common sense" security measures. Signed firmware and the sideloading ID requirements on Android also helps to prevent stalkerware, which is a growing threat far scarier than some occasional sideloaded virus or DDoS attack. Never assume sideloading is consensual.

      • By ShowalkKama 2025-10-141:591 reply

        >What about DDoSs that come from sideloaded, unofficial, buggy, or poorly written apps? That's what IoT manufacturers will point to, and where most attacks historically come from.

        any source for this claim? Outside of very specific scenarios which differ significantly for the current botnet market (like manjaro sending too many requests to the aur or an android application embedding an url to a wikipedia image) I cannot remember one occourence of such a bug being versatile enough to create a new whole cybercrime market segment.

        >They'll point to whether your Mac really needs more than 100mbps.

        it does, because sometimes my computer bursts up to 1gbps for a sustained amount of time, unlike the average iot device that has a predictable communication pattern.

        >Signed firmware and the sideloading ID requirements on Android also helps to prevent stalkerware, which is a growing threat far scarier than some occasional sideloaded virus or DDoS attack. Never assume sideloading is consensual.

        if someone can unlock your phone, go into the settings, enable installation of apps for an application (ex. a browser), download an apk and install it then they can do quite literally anything, from enabling adb to exfiltrating all your files.

        • By gjsman-1000 2025-10-142:03

          Historically, it was called Windows XP and Vista about 15 years ago (Blaster, Sasser, MyDoom, Stuxnet, Conficker?). Microsoft clamped down, hard, across the board, but everyone outside of Big Tech is still catching up.

          Despite Microsoft's efforts, 911 S5 was roughly 19 million Windows PCs in 2024, in news that went mostly under the radar. It spread almost entirely through dangerous "free VPN" apps that people installed all over the place. (Why is sideloading under attack so much lately? 19 million people thought it would make them more secure, and instead it turned their home internet into criminal gateways with police visits. I strongly suspect this incident, and how it spread among well-meaning security-minded people, was the invisible turning point in Big Tech against software freedom lately.)

          https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/how-to-identify-and-re...

          > if someone can unlock your phone, go into the settings, enable installation of apps for an application (ex. a browser), download an apk and install it then they can do quite literally anything, from enabling adb to exfiltrating all your files.

          Which is more important, and a growing threat? Dump all her photos once; or install a disguised app that pretends to be a boring stock app nobody uses, that provides ongoing access for years, with everything in real-time up to the minute? Increasingly it's the latter. She'll never suspect the "Samsung Battery Optimizer" or even realize it came from an APK. No amount of sandboxing and permissions can detect an app with a deliberately false identity.

      • By pjc50 2025-10-1413:53

        > Signed firmware and the sideloading ID requirements

        Ending the last corner of actually free market in software is quite a cost for something that wouldn't prevent DDoS.

        > sideloaded, unofficial, buggy, or poorly written apps? That's what IoT manufacturers will point to, and where most attacks historically come from

        Is that actually true? What evidence do we have, vs. vulnerabilities in the OEM software (the more common case)?

    • By high_na_euv 2025-10-1413:082 reply

      > A $1 SoC can easily handle this these days.

      Could you elaborate?

      • By pjc50 2025-10-1413:511 reply

        I think there's some exaggeration as few $1 SoC parts come with 10G Ethernet, and >1G to the home is not common, but pretty much any home router can saturate its own uplink - it would be useless if it couldn't!

        • By sekh60 2025-10-1414:571 reply

          Not always the case. Generating traffic can be more computationally intense than routing the traffic. I've done speed tests on a few routers local to it and the results have been less than stellar compared to getting expected results with it just routing traffic (consumer routers). Granted these tests were a few years ago and things have progressed, but how often are people upgrading their routers?

          • By kees99 2025-10-1422:12

            Correct.

            Also, most 1Gbit/s and faster routers have hardware-accelerated packet forwarding, aka "flow offloading", aka "hardware NAT", where forwarded packets mostly don't touch software at all.

            Some routers even have internal "CPU" port of packet core with significantly slower line rate than that of external ports'. So traffic that terminates/originates at the router is necessarily quite a bit slower, regardless of possibly extra-beefy processor, and efficient software. Not really a problem since that traffic would normally be limited to UI, software updates, ARP/NDP/DHCP, and occasional first packet of a forwarded network connection.

      • By martinald 2025-10-151:22

        A Allwinner H616 is Quad-Core ARM and can definitely saturate gigabit ethernet with packet generation.

    • By devwastaken 2025-10-142:471 reply

      1gb upload is extraordinarily rare.

      • By saagarjha 2025-10-142:515 reply

        It’s not; most places that give you gigabit fiber will give you a symmetric connection.

        • By Xss3 2025-10-1418:231 reply

          Define most places? I know i dont get one (uk) and neither does my german friend or texan friend.

          I've only ever seen one despite having used 4 different ISPs for gigabit, and that one was special. It was in an apartment i rented in a converted office tower, line was done via a b2b provider then included in the rent.

          • By saagarjha 2025-10-157:40

            I'm in the US and most fiber providers (I checked a handful: AT&T, Sonic, Google Fiber, Frontier) all provide symmetric connections.

        • By zokier 2025-10-1413:201 reply

          Aren't most residential fiber deployments PONs which generally do not offer symmetric bandwidth? E.g. 10G-PON has 10G down / 2.5G up.

          • By Hikikomori 2025-10-1416:34

            Depends on country, its not common here.

        • By typpilol 2025-10-143:571 reply

          Yup. Spectrum is Michigan will give you up to 2gbps down but not anything more than 200mbps up

          • By dylan604 2025-10-144:422 reply

            Is Spectrum fiber or DOCSIS? I didn't realize anyone was pushing these kinds of numbers for fiber. What's the point other than screwing the users?

            • By zokier 2025-10-1413:31

              Penny pinching. Afaik asymmetric PON is the cheapest possible network tech at scale.

        • By devwastaken 2025-10-1423:201 reply

          Nope. less than a percent of a percent. symmetric plans are extra cost and offered primarily to business.

          almost all homes have no ability to exceed gigabit. infact almost all new homes dont even have data wiring. people just want their netflix to work on wifi.

          • By saagarjha 2025-10-157:41

            I didn't pay anything extra for symmetric.

        • By vitaflo 2025-10-143:073 reply

          Most places do not have fiber.

          • By Dylan16807 2025-10-143:15

            We know. The problem is that the above comment said "extraordinarily rare" which is a very different and incorrect threshold.

          • By dylan604 2025-10-144:411 reply

            But for those that do...symmetric is the norm. The number of fiber connections is only going up.

            • By devwastaken 2025-10-1423:22

              symmetric is not the norm. the infra costs are not worth it. symmetric is primarily a business offering.

          • By ls612 2025-10-143:422 reply

            This is probably technically true but very misleading. Fiber penetration in the US has been consistently rising for over a decade now and it is not at all uncommon to have either Google Fiber, Fios, or a local fiber provider available to you in a big city. I bet within the next decade most places will have gigabit fiber available.

            • By Xss3 2025-10-1418:282 reply

              There are probably more English speakers using the Internet in India than there are in the USA...Let alone the hundreds of millions elsewhere.

              You cant just assume everyone is talking about your country online.

              • By shagmin 2025-10-1419:14

                Does it really matter? The grandparent comment states the bandwidth is becoming even more readily available in the US, while the article itself says the bots were largely hosted by US ISPs, and that's obviously enough bandwidth to already cause global disruptions. But that's just the source of the attack, and who is on the receiving end is another.

                I get being too US-centric, but I think it's interesting if the US has the right combination of hosting tons of infected devices and having the bandwidth to use them on a much larger scale compared to other countries and possible implications.

              • By Cody-99 2025-10-1421:28

                You can assume the county when it is in the title.

                >DDoS Botnet Aisuru Blankets US ISPs in Record DDoS

            • By _carbyau_ 2025-10-144:56

              The US is a big place. But the world is bigger. The internet works across the whole world.

              There's a long way to go before fibre is commonplace across the world.

    • By nick32661123 2025-10-140:562 reply

      Seems more likely that residential modems will be required to use ISP-provided equipment that has government mandated chips, firmware, etc to filter outbound traffic for DDoS prevention.

      • By DaSHacka 2025-10-141:02

        Why should they be required to have hardware in their own network to filter that out when the ISP is obviously receiving all of their traffic anyway?

      • By pjc50 2025-10-1413:55

        Sometimes the attack, or amplification, comes from the ISP-provided router and its bargain basement firmware.

  • By lgeek 2025-10-141:362 reply

    This is very challenging, in about one year the biggest recorded DDoS attack has increased from 5 Tbps to almost 30.

    Almost all of the DDoS mitigation providers have been struggling for a few weeks because they just don't have enough edge capacity.

    And normal hosting companies that are not focused on DDoS mitigation also seem to have had issues, but with less impact to other customers as they'll just blackhole addresses under larger attacks. For example, I've seen all connections to / from some of my services at Hetzner time out way more frequently than usual, and some at OVH too. Then one of my smaller hosting providers got hit with an attack of at least 1 Tbps which saturated a bunch of their transit links.

    Cloudflare and maybe a couple of the other enterprise providers (Gcore?) operate at a large enough scale to handle these attacks, but all the smaller ones (who tend to have more affordable rates and more application-specific filters for sensitive applications that can't deal with much leakage) seem to be in quite a bad spot right now. Cloudflare Magic Transit pricing supposedly starts at around $4k / month, and it would really suck if that became the floor for being able to run a non-HTTP service online.

    Something like Team Cymru's UTRS service (with Flowspec support) could potentially help to mitigate attacks at the source, but residential ISPs and maybe the T1s would need to join it, and I don't see that happening anytime soon.

    • By BobaFloutist 2025-10-1417:14

      > has increased from 5 Tbps to almost 30

      That's nearly a pint, or over 2 daL!

    • By TZubiri 2025-10-147:27

      I'm surprised that the best response to ddos is not blocking traffic, but just handling it.

  • By userbinator 2025-10-141:511 reply

    I'd rather there be periodic DDoS attacks, than a locked-down highly-regulated internet. Don't forget that infamous Franklin quote, and what Stallman has been warning us about for the past few decades.

    I can already see the authoritarians salivating every time something like this happens.

    • By dylan604 2025-10-144:471 reply

      > I can already see the authoritarians salivating every time something like this happens.

      Tinfoil hat theory says they do this intentionally so that the users demand stricter access willingly. Always better to have someone think it is their idea

      • By Bender 2025-10-1512:26

        My tinfoil body-suit suggests this is how CDN's came to be. People's websites were hammered and extorted indirectly by friends of insert CDN startup here. The tin-foil body-suit also suggests the end goal was to hover up all the data and sell it to the government and/or the highest bidder.

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